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This paper examines whether the informal economy in northern Nigeria aggravates or mitigates religious 
conflict.  Drawing on recent fieldwork in the northern Nigerian cities of Kano and Kaduna, it challenges the 
assumption that religious diversity is a driver of conflict, and that religiously specialized networks within the 
informal economy intensify violent divisions within society.  A range of informal activities, including motorcycle 
taxis, informal tyre dealers, tailors and pepper soup producers, provide insights into distinct patterns of 
relations across the religious divide, characterized as complementarity, competition and value conflict.  
Attention is focused on the relative role of informal institutions and formal interventions, such as taxation, in 
diffusing or exacerbating conflict at the grassroots level.   
 
Introduction 
In contemporary Nigeria, the signs of a crumbling social contract are there for all to see.  A 
vast and growing informal economy supports 65% of the non-agricultural labour force, who 
get little from the state, and give little in return.  Poverty and resource struggles are boiling 
over into ethnic and religious violence in various parts of the country, as receding tensions 
in the Niger Delta give way to violent religious conflict in the predominantly Muslim north.  
The state itself seems increasingly incapable of garnering support or imposing order owing 
to its unpopular submission to decades of crushing market reforms and the corrosive effect 
on legitimacy of corruption and regionalist agendas.  This noxious combination of expanding 
informality, inter-communal violence and popular suspicion of the state has become 
particularly worrying in northern Nigeria, where mounting violence between the Muslim 
majority and Christian minorities has culminated in a spate of bombings and sectarian 
attacks by the extremist Islamic group, Boko Haram in which thousands of people have been 
killed since 2009.  Drawing on recent fieldwork in northern Nigeria, this article considers the 
role of the informal economy in this alarming trajectory of social disintegration.  In a context 
of religious conflict and a delinquent state, is the informal economy part of the problem, or 
can it be part of the solution? 
 
Afro-pessimist perspectives on ‘war economies’ and ‘clandestine markets’ have argued that 
that expanding African informal economies are linked to violent conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 
2004; Reno 2000; Roitman 2004).  Alternative interpretations focusing on the role of 
informal economies in market development and state-building offer a more optimistic 
analysis of the ability of informal markets to build bridges between antagonistic groups and 
create new opportunities for rebuilding state-society relations (International Alert 2006; 
Killick 2005; Menkhaus 2006/7; Raeymaekers et al. 2008).  These divergent analyses focus 
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attention on the possibility that the institutional processes at play under the surface of the 
state may be just as important to rebuilding relations of order and authority as formal 
institutional reforms.  Understanding how these processes work requires that we move 
beyond Eurocentric debates about ‘good governance’ or ‘the state as organized crime’ to 
focus on how local institutional realities shape social tensions and governance outcomes in 
African contexts (Leander 2004; Meagher 2012).   
 
In the context of northern Nigeria, the role of informal enterprise in limiting or exacerbating 
religious conflict is shaped by local specificities of informal organization.  While informal 
enterprise makes up the bulk of popular livelihood activities, particular activities tend to be 
dominated by specific religious or ethnic groups.  Does this situation tend to accentuate 
conflict between more and less successful enterprise networks, or does it build collaborative 
inter-religious relations through economic interdependence and familiarity among 
producers, traders, customers and suppliers on different sides of the religious divide?  Do 
informal enterprise networks on different sides of the religious divide relate to the state in 
the same way, or are there important differences in levels of support for and assistance 
from the state?  Understanding the day to day experience of inter-religious contacts and 
state-society relations among informal actors in areas of intensifying religious conflict can 
offer new lessons about the forces that exacerbate religious tensions, and the institutional 
resources and policy measures that may help to reduce them.  
 
These issues are addressed in the context of fieldwork I carried out in the northern Nigerian 
cities of Kano and Kaduna in October and November 2011.  In each of these two cities, I 
focused on informal activities involving different relations between Muslim and Christian 
communities, ranging from complementarity between Muslim and Christian actors to 
competition and value conflicts.  Selected activities include motorcycle taxis, tailors, tyre 
dealers, butchers and pepper soup producers in beer parlours.  In each activity, a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods were used to examine how conflict has 
affected relations across the religious divide, and how inter-religious relations are shaped by 
wider relations with the state.  Key elements in relations between informal activities and the 
state relate to the political mobilization of religion as well to relations of social provisioning 
and taxation.  These various elements will be drawn together in an analysis of how informal 
economies shape possibilities for resilience as well as vulnerabilities to conflict. 
 
The article will be laid out as follows:  after setting the scene with a consideration of key 
perspectives on informality, religious conflict and governance, I will provide an outline of 
the setting and methodology of the study.  Two subsequent section will undertake an 
analysis of inter-religious relations in selected informal activities in Kano and Kaduna.  This 
will be followed by a more quantitative analysis, focusing on how inter-religious relations 
among informal actors across the two cities are shaped by wider socio-economic factors.  A 
final section will draw wider conclusions regarding the role of informal economies in conflict 
resolution and improved governance.  Through an analysis of the realities of informal 
economic organization in divided societies, this article will challenge the conventional 
wisdom by showing that under some circumstances large informal economies can reduce 




Informality, Religious Conflict and Governance 
Since the late 1980s, religious relations in northern Nigeria have been marked by 
intensifying conflict, involving over 10,000 deaths as well as widespread economic 
disruption (Haynes 2009).  Repeated clashes between the Muslim majority and Christian 
minorities have taken place in various cities across the north, ranging from the ‘burning of 
churches’ in 1987, through the Zangon Kataf and Kano riots in the early 1990s, the ‘Miss 
World’, Jos and anti-Shari’a riots in the early 2000s, the ongoing Jos crisis and the Boko 
Haram attacks since 2009.   These waves of religious riots have involved Muslim attacks on 
settler Christian communities, Christian attacks on settler Muslim communities in Christian 
areas of the Nigerian Middle Belt, and retaliatory attacks by Christian or Muslim 
communities in response to previous clashes or perceived political threats. 
 
In recent year, economists and political theorists have associated violence with ethno-
religious diversity and large informal economies (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Duffield 2001; 
Reno 2000).  African informal economies, which often involve ethnic and religious forms of 
organization, are viewed as mechanisms of clientism and corruption, giving rise to ‘violent 
modes of accumulation’, ‘war economies, and ‘the criminalization of the state’. In a paper 
on African informal economies, Reno (2006:31) contends that informal economies ‘fuse the 
exercise of political power to violent predation in informal and clandestine markets…’.  
Repeated emphasis on the links between ethno-religious divisions, informal economies and 
mounting violence make it easy to forget that religion and informal economic networks 
have historically played an integrative and developmental rather than a conflictual role in 
West Africa.  Economic historians have documented the role of Islam in bridging ethnic 
divides and providing a framework for economic cooperation and trade across northern 
Nigeria and West Africa more broadly (Austen 1987; Curtin 1975; Hopkins 1973; Lovejoy 
1980).  The legendary efficiency of the Mouride, Hausa and Igbo trading networks in West 
Africa illustrate the role of religion in fostering cross-ethnic networks of trust and solidarity, 
and new ethics of production and accumulation (Hashim & Meagher 1999; Meagher 2009; 
Cruise O'Brien 1975; Meagher 2010).  As Jean-Philippe Platteau (2009) points out, religion in 
African societies can be ‘an engine capable of driving changes in behaviour that are 
conducive to capital accumulation and productive effort....  Religion thus appears to have far 
more influence on people’s behaviour than formal rules and state institutions, providing a 
useful bridge between tradition and modernity.’ 
 
Understanding these contradictions requires closer attention to the effects of religious 
diversity, and to the institutional features that can create peace as well as conflict in 
religiously diverse societies.  Measures created by Collier and Hoffler (2004) associate 
religious diversity, like ethnic diversity, with an increased propensity to conflict.  In more 
recent work, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) argue that the issue is not religious 
diversity per se but religious polarization.   While measures of diversity reflect the sheer 
heterogeneity of religious groups, polarization is greatest where two religious groups are of 
equal size, and is shown to have a ‘negative impact on growth through its effect on 
investment, government expenditure and the probability of civil wars’.  However, there is a 
growing awareness that not all religiously diverse or even polarized societies are mired in 
conflict.  Explaining why some diverse societies are peaceful while others are riven by 
violence has focused attention on how religious differences can be overcome by 
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institutional features that diffuse or mitigate political and economic tensions (Armakolas 
2011; Jha 2007; Varshney 2001; Stewart 2008).   
 
One line of research focuses on the role of integrated civil organization and the state in 
maintaining peace amid diversity.  In his well-known research on India, Ashutosh Varshney 
(2001) considers the integrative role of religiously mixed organizations within civil society as 
key to preventing violence in religiously diverse settings.  He argues that ‘What matters for 
ethnic violence is not whether ethnic life or social capital exists but whether social and civic 
ties cut across ethnic groups. ...trust based on interethnic, not intraethnic, networks is 
critical’ (Varshney 2001:392).  In the context of Bosnia, Armakolas (2011) also highlights the 
importance of religiously-mixed social institutions for maintaining peaceful relations, but he 
also draws attention to the role of the state in shoring up interethnic organization in the 
face of extremist pressures from ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’.  According to Armakolas, 
‘associational civic links are significant for opposing extremism:  yet, the sustainability and 
success of the opposition depends crucially on the ability of the political system to ‘distance’ 
itself from the extremist influence.  Grassroots activism may prove futile if the ‘battle’ for 
the political system is lost.’  In short, peaceful relations in religiously diverse societies are 
not just products of historical contingency, but result from inter-ethnic organization within 
civil society, and inter-ethnic commitments on the part of the state. 
 
Others argue that markets and communal specialization rather than states and ethno-
religious integration are key to building peace amid violent communal divisions 
(International Alert 2006; Killick 2005; Menkhaus 2006/7; Raeymaekers et al. 2008; Jha 
2007).  In fragile state environments where formal economies are weak, informal markets 
are said to foster interdependence among divided communities, and give rise to common 
interests in peace and stability that override incentives for conflict.  Drawing lessons from 
Indian economic history, Saumitra Jha (2007) shows that religiously specialized trading 
networks were able to create a framework for peaceful relations in a society that had 
suffered from religious conflict in the past.  ‘In medieval Indian ports, Hindus and Muslims 
developed institutions that continue to support ethnic tolerance today.... methods that have 
been employed in medieval ports include the encouragement of specialization within 
groups, the fostering of opportunities for repeated interaction in both economic and non-
economic spheres, and the creation of institutionalized mechanisms to allow the sharing of 
gains from trade’ (Jha 2007:8).  Ethnic specialization is said to promote complementarity 
particularly where minorities have specialized skills and contacts that are costly to 
reproduce, and can foster peace as long as taxation or philanthropic contributions ensure 
the redistribution of gains within society.  A similar argument is made in contemporary DR 
Congo by Timothy Raeymaekers (2010), who maintains that efforts to tax ethnically-
specialized trading networks for the provision of public infrastructure and basic services has 
created an enclave of peace and security in the violent maelstrom of the Eastern DR Congo.  
Recent research on the role of taxation in state-building also suggests that taxing the 
informal economy improves governance and accountability in developing countries (Joshi & 
Ayee 2008; Prichard 2009)     
 
Four critical points come out of these considerations.  The first is that religious polarization, 
in which two groups are more evenly matched, may make societies more prone to conflict 
than religious diversity per se.  The second point is that even where religious groups are 
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demographically polarized, conflict can be prevented by institutional arrangements that 
promote collaboration and diffuse tensions.  Thirdly, the nature of civil society organizations 
is key to maintaining peace, though there is disagreement as to whether communally-mixed 
organizations are required, or if communally-specialized organizations backed by 
institutions for constructive interaction and redistribution can achieve the same end.  
Finally, there is also some debate about whether peaceful interaction amid religious 
diversity is achieved through markets or if there is a need for state action to delegitimize 
extremist mobilization or to redistribute resources through taxation.  In the context of 
northern Nigeria, the specific structure of religious diversity, and the respective roles of 
grassroots organization and the state in institutionalizing and maintaining peaceful inter-
religious relations provide a useful framework for examining how religious conflict is shaped 
by informal economic organization. 
Religious Conflict and the Informal Economy in Northern Nigeria 
The questions raised above are addressed in the context of empirical research on cross-
religious informal economic organization carried out in the northern Nigerian cities of Kano 
and Kaduna, located in Kano and Kaduna States, respectively.  Both cities have large and 
dynamic informal economies, and a recent history of serious religious conflict.  However, 
the two cities also have important historical and structural differences.   Kano is a centuries-
old capital of the commercially dynamic Kano Emirate.  A city of 2.6 million, Kano is 
characterized by a large Muslim majority and a small Christian minority amounting to about 
15% of the population and made up largely of settlers from southern Nigeria.  By contrast, 
Kaduna is a colonial city, founded by the British in 1913 as an administrative rather than a 
commercial centre.  Kaduna has a population of just under one million people, comprising 
large indigenous Christian as well as Muslim communities, with Christians amounting to 
about 40% of the population.  While Kano lies in one of the northern states that adopted 
Shari’a law in 2000, Shari’a law was violently contested in Kaduna State and its adoption was 
ultimately abandoned. 
 
In each of the two cities, a range of informal activities were selected to reflect distinct 
patterns of inter-religious relations, characterized as complementarity, competition and 
value conflict.  In Kano, motorcycle taxis represent relations of complementarity; tyre 
dealers were selected to represent competitive relations; and butchers and sellers of goat’s 
head pepper soup in beer parlours exemply relations of value conflict.  There was a slight 
variation in the activities selected in Kaduna, owing to differences in social history and 
informal commercial organization.  The study activities in Kaduna involved tailors as 
examples of complementarity, the religiously mixed motorcycle taxi business exemplifies 
inter-religious competition, and butchers and Christian goat meat sellers (who supply 
pepper soup producers in beer parlours) represent relations of value conflict. 
 
Interviews were conducted with a range of informal operators in each activity, as well as 
with the leadership of any informal occupational associations associated with the activity.  
Across the two cities, 14 interviews were conducted with leadership of key informal 
occupational associations, which amounted to four occupational associations in Kano and 
five in Kaduna. Twenty-five interviews were conducted with rank and file members of the 
various activities, including four focus group discussions, and further interviews were held 
with a range of other key actors, including local government officials, state revenue officers, 
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and officers of relevant formal sector traders’ and labour unions . The interviews were 
followed up with a survey of 110 informal operators across the study activities in both cities, 
using stratified random sampling with quotas for each activity spread across key operating 
sites within each city.  The survey focused on employment history, inter-religious relations 
with fellow operators and customers, personal costs sustained as a result of religious 
violence, attitudes to taxation, and feelings about prospects for inter-religious relations in 
the future.  Explicit efforts were made in the interviews and survey to avoid any tendency to 
romanticize inter-religious relations within the informal economy.  Repeated rounds of 
devastating religious violence have made questions about religious relations and personal 
experiences highly sensitive, particularly among rank and file informal operators who bear 
the brunt of the physical and economic consequences. With livelihoods and employment 
acting as key points of tension in the structurally adjusted economy of contemporary 
Nigeria, religiously specialized networks can easily become fault lines rather than bridges 
across social divides.  The objective of the study was to find out which tendency is prevailing 
in which circumstances, with a view to making a contribution to more grounded theorizing 
about informality, conflict and governance in Africa. 
Inter-Religious Relations in Kano’s Informal Economy 
Kano is a commercially dynamic city, with well-established business groups and associations 
dating back centuries (Hashim and Meagher 1999; Lovejoy 1980).  Occupational 
organization among the Hausa Muslim indigenes of the city is based on a guild-like system 
that enjoyed strong links with the pre-colonial state.  Colonialism has led to a significant 
weakening of the Hausa guilds, and many have collapsed entirely.  By contrast, Kano’s 
significant Igbo Christian community has a strong system of commercial organization, forged 
in the stateless context of pre-colonial Igbo society, and tempered by the realities of a 
migrant commercial minority.  Christianity has also given the Igbo educational advantages 
owing to historical tensions between Islam and mission-led Western education.  Across 
Nigeria, Igbo commercial institutions have made them particularly successful in small scale 
business activities, and in Kano they tend to dominate trade in a range of modern goods 
such as auto parts and building materials.  This has been a source of ongoing tension, but 
relations between Igbo Christians and Hausa Muslims in Kano have been characterized as 
much by cooperation as by conflict.  The selection of informal activities to represent 
different forms of relations across the religious divide provide an opportunity to examine 
the interplay between commercial organization, institutional mechanisms for cooperation 
and conflict resolution, and the effects of economic resentment and mounting religious 
conflict.   
History and Structure of Selected Informal Activities 
Complementarity:  Motorcycle Taxis 
Motorcycle taxis were selected to represent relations of cooperation across the religious 
divide.  Motorcycle taxis, affectionately known as ‘okada’ or ‘achaba’, are an 
overwhelmingly Muslim activity in Kano, with Muslims comprising well over 90% of 
operators.  However, the activity has remained dependent on good relations with Christians 
owing to the high share of Christian passengers, and the importance of the large market in 
Sabon Gari, the Christian quarters of Kano, as a key point for collecting and dropping off 
passengers.  In Kano, the motorcycle taxi business absorbs a vast segment of retrenched or 
moonlighting employees and civil servants, failed traders, struggling pensioners and 
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unemployed youth and Koranic students streaming in from the rural areas.  While some 
own their own motorcycles, a significant proportion is engaged in hire-purchase 
arrangements, or simply operates the motorcycle for others to whom they must make daily 
returns. 
 
In recent years, the motorcycle taxis has been banned in Jos, Maiduguri and other cities 
owing to association with crime and religious violence, swelling the ranks of Kano okada 
riders. The number of motorcycle taxi operators in Kano State has been generously 
estimated at 2 million, giving Kano the dubious honour of hosting the largest motorcycle taxi 
sector in the country.  The constant influx of motorcycle taxis from other states adds to the 
pressure on incomes among Kano’s motorcycle taxi riders by over-saturating the market.  
While motorcycle taxi riding has become an important source of livelihoods for those 
without skills or options, it has never been legalized as an activity.  It therefore remains 
extremely vulnerable to state crackdowns as well as to routine extortion by traffic 
authorities.  The expanding motorcycle taxi sector has been associated with growing 
problems of traffic congestion, dangerous driving and urban violence.  Hospitals in many 
large Nigerian cities have a special ward designated for victims of motorcycle taxi accidents, 
known commonly as the ‘Okada Ward’.  A dangerous cycle of poverty, frustration and 
vulnerability to harassment has been exacerbated by links to religious violence and an 
association with the terrorist activities of Boko Haram (Sunday Trust 2010; BBC News 2012; 
Time Magazine 2011). 
Competition:  Informal Tyre Dealers 
Kano’s informal tyre dealers represent a more lucrative activity in which Muslims and 
Christians operate in competition with each other.  Hausa Muslim inhabitants started the 
business in Kano in the late colonial period.  Igbo settlers began entering the business a 
decade or so later, but quickly surpassed their Hausa hosts owing to embedded 
organizational advantages of the Igbo apprenticeship system and strong occupational 
associations.  The Igbo apprenticeship system is famous across Nigeria for its long and strict 
training regime, involving years of service to a ‘master’, which is rewarded by the provision 
of significant start-up capital at the end of the apprenticeship – a practice known in Nigeria 
as ‘settling’ an apprentice (Meagher 2010; Forrest 1994).  The Hausa and Igbo informal tyre 
markets have grown up in separate locations where they continue to operate according to 
distinct ethnic business systems.  These two tyre markets continue to run parallel 
operations based on distinct ethnic business systems.  The activity remains predominantly 
informal in both cases; dealers are largely unregistered, and the activity has often been a 
target of police harassment owing to accusations that the markets were used to sell stolen 
tyres. 
Value Conflict:  Goat’s Head Pepper Soup and Butchers 
The preparation of goat’s head pepper soup (isi-ewu), a popular Nigerian beer snack, 
represents relations of value conflict.  It is a Christian activity dominated by Igbo women, 
but depends on butchers, a male Muslim activity in northern Nigeria, to supply the main 
input1.  The goat’s head pepper soup business has been significantly affected by the 
                                                     
1
 The butchers involved in the goat’s head pepper soup business are a branch of the trade known as ‘Masu 
Babbaka’ that specialize in goat and ram heads only, and are therefore highly dependent on the market for 
goat’s head pepper soup.  
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imposition of Shari’a law in Kano State, particularly since the banning of alcohol outside 
Sabon Gari in 2004.  This has semi-criminalized all activities associated with the selling of 
alcohol, making isi-ewu producers very hesitant to be identified, to be counted or to do 
interviews.  It has also subjected isi-ewu producers to an intensification of police 
harassment and predatory taxation since the mid-2000s.  Beer shipments are still 
intercepted by the Kano State Islamic security force, Hisbah, on their way to Sabon Gari, and 
the bottles publicly destroyed. 
 
While the activity is organized around a fundamental conflict of religious values, relations 
between isi-ewu producers and butchers share certain commonalities.  They both constitute 
lowly or despised elements in Hausa Islamic society:  isi-ewu producers because they are 
involved in the selling of beer, and butchers because they are traditionally a semi-servile 
caste within Hausa social structure.  Both groups are mutually concerned about the factors 
that have contributed to undermining the activity in the past few years.  Some of these are 
structural rather than religious, particularly the poor electricity supply which poses serious 
problems for keeping such a delicate type of meat fresh, and the rising cost of goats and 
other ingredients which is seen to be a product of the general economic malaise in Nigeria.  
Religious conflict is also recognized as a problem by both sides, owing to its negative effect 
on the market for isi-ewu. 
Associations and Relations with the State 
Motorcycle taxi riders in Kano are organized under the state branch of a national 
association, Amalgamated Commercial Motorcycle Owners and Riders Association of Nigeria 
(ACOMORAN).  The Kano branch of ACOMORAN was formed in the mid-2000, assimilating 
the numerous fragmented locality-based associations across the state.  Membership in a 
registered national association has given Kano’s motorcycle taxi riders a greater political 
profile, although it has not changed the fact that the activity itself remains informal and 
without legal standing.  Given that they comprise roughly one quarter of Nigeria’s 8 million 
motorcycle taxi riders (Vanguard 2011); however, the sheer size of Kano’s motorcycle taxi 
sector has given the Kano State branch of ACOMORAN considerable access and influence at 
the State and national levels (interview, ACOMORAN officials, Sabon Gari, 18 Oct.2011).  
Owing to the large nation-wide consitituency represented by motorcycle taxis, and the 
other political advantages of controlling a large and highly mobile activity, governors and 
even presidential candidates take an active interest in the leadership of organization at the 
federal and State levels (This Day 2011). 
 
Kano’s informal tyre dealers have two distinct forms of organization.  The Hausa dealers 
were organized according to the old Hausa guild system, which collapsed completely over 
20 years ago.  As a result, Hausa tyre dealers rely largely on personal and identity-based 
connections with the Local Government to protect their interest.  By contrast, the Igbo 
dealers have a strong association, called the Kano Tyre-Sellers Welfare Association, which 
provides members with business services, dispute resolution, and social welfare assistance 
for bereavement and ceremonies.  The association organizes extra security arrangements 
with the police, retains lawyers to deal collectively with accusations of sale of stolen goods, 
and negotiates directly with Local Government revenue authorities.  The Igbo tyre dealers’ 
association is particularly effective in pooling capital for deposits on wholesale purchases, 
while the bulk of Hausa dealers suffer from chronic shortages of capital which severely 
hamper their ability to advance in the business.  The embedded advantages in training and 
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access to capital that arise from the Igbo association and business system are often 
perceived as excluding Hausa entrants and creating unfair competition. 
 
Goat’s head pepper soup producers are members of a larger association of beer parlour 
operators called the Food Sellers and Beverage Association.  The Association was formed 
around 2009 in response to intensifying problems of taxation and police harassment arising 
from the banning of alcohol under Shari’a law.  Proprietors complained that the standard 
Health Tax, Sanitation tax and Signboard tax were randomly supplemented by a TV tax if 
there was a television to entertain viewers, a ‘chicken tax’ if chicken pepper soup was sold, a 
‘fish tax’ for fish pepper soup, etc.  Police used to lock up their shops if they refused or were 
unable to pay.  The association has been relatively successful in providing a measure of 
protection from extreme taxation as well as collection in times of bereavement, but is 
unable to confront the equally pressing problem of poor electricity supply.  Most butchers 
are members of a well-established national association, the National Butchers Union of 
Nigeria.  Within the union, they have their own branch specialized in goat and ram heads, 
called the Masu Babbaka Branch, which is printed on their ID cards.  Butchers have no 
particular worries about taxation as they operate in the market where tax levels are very 
low, but their established national union did not seem to be any more able to address the 
pressing problem of electricity for cold storage. 
 
Key roles of associations across these activities relate to negotiating taxation and creating 
channels of access to the state for assistance and services.  Kano’s motorcycle taxi riders do 
not currently pay tax, as the activity is technically illegal, and participants are seen as having 
fallen on hard times.  Their association, ACOMORAN, is involved in creating a new system of 
taxation and registration, and is negotiating with the State and Local Governments over tax 
levels, though this process is driven more by demands of the state and interests of the 
ACOMORAN executive than by members of the activity.  While many motorcycle taxi riders 
indicate a willingness to pay tax if it brings protection from constant police extortion, others 
already facing saturated markets, rising petrol prices, and daily returns to the motorcycle 
owner are less enthusiastic.  The more empowered Hausa tyre dealers have no association, 
but are able to use personal and identity-based connections to negotiate taxation.  Seen as 
respectable but sometimes hard-pressed indigenes, they often succeed in reducing taxes to 
a negligible amount, and even evading them altogether – a claim made by the Hausa tyre 
dealers themselves as well as by their Igbo counterparts.  Butchers also benefit from 
identity-based ties and a well-established national association, and do not seem at all 
concerned about taxation levels.   
 
By contrast, Christian dominated activities require more rigorous negotiation over taxes.  
The Igbo tyre dealers are dependent on their highly organized association to provide 
protection from extremely high levels of local taxation.  The association has succeeded in 
negotiating taxes down from what were perceived as extortionate levels, as well as 
protecting members from ‘bogus taxes’, and in return collects taxes in bulk from members 
to remit to the government.  The Food and Beverage Sellers Association also assists goat’s 
head pepper soup producers by negotiating down taxes and collecting them in bulk for the 
government.  Interviews indicated that associational intervention had reduced levels of 




Despite comparative success across these activities in negotiating over taxes, they enjoy 
very different levels of access to the state in ways that have as much to do with ethno-
religious identity as with associational organization.  ACOMORAN has significant access to 
the state at all levels, while the highly organized Igbo tyre association complains of being 
unable to get a response from local government over problems of basic service provision in 
Sabon Gari, or to get an audience with officials in the State government despite repeated 
attempts.  Similarly, pepper soup producers face a number of problems beyond taxation 
that are beyond the power of their association.  Access to electricity in Sabon Gari is a 
critical worry, both for keeping goat’s head and for cold beer.  But their association, which is 
overwhelmingly female and Christian, lacks the access as well as the leverage to do anything 
about issues of no interest to local government and state officials.  Indeed, the largely 
unorganized Hausa tyre dealers have been more successful in reducing taxes and gaining 
access to services than the more organized Christian-dominated activities. 
Inter-Religious Relations 
Despite the tensions that exist among them, a surprising degree of cooperation and 
interdependence appears to prevail between Muslim and Christian informal actors across all 
activities.  Even in activities characterized by competition and value conflict, the prevalence 
of good relations across the religious divide is demonstrated by the persistence of a range of 
collaborative practices, including mutual assistance, business services and granting credit 
across religious lines, in relations with business counterparts as well as customers.  Muslim 
motorcycle taxi riders spoke of complementary relations with Igbo Christian motorcycle 
dealers from whom many obtain motorcycles through hire-purchase agreements.  They said 
they prefered the Igbo hire-purchase arrangements over hire-purchase schemes offered by 
the Kano State government, because the Igbo arrangements are open to anyone, while the 
government schemes tend to be highly selective (interview Kofar Ruwa 23 Oct 2011).  Hausa 
and Igbo tyre dealers confirmed that they often extend credit between the two tyre markets 
to dealers of the other religious persuasion.  They will call on dealers in the other market if 
they lack a brand requested by a customer, and the goods are routinely sent over on credit.  
Butchers also regularly extend credit to pepper soup producers, some of whom have been 
regular customers for years.  Pepper soup producers regularly phone in orders to butchers, 
and have the order delivered on credit to the beer parlour.  If anything, these services have 
increased owing to efforts by butchers to retain custom in a struggling market.  Butchers 
claimed that they have no religious concerns about selling goat’s head to pepper soup 
producers, since there is no prohibition against selling meat, and they have no responsibility 
for what people choose to drink with it. 
 
Relations with customers across the religious divide also seemed to be resilient.  Motorcycle 
taxi riders indicated that there is no avoidance between Muslim operators and Christian 
passengers, largely because of mutual need.  The ban on carrying women passengers 
introduced under Shari’a was flouted by many Muslim operators, leading to embarrassing 
court cases, and eventually forcing a relaxation of the ban (Punch 6 Jan 2006).  Similarly, 
Muslim as well as Christian tyre dealers claimed to have experienced no reduction in 
customers across the religious divide, and no unwillingness to sell to them.  A former 
chairman of the Igbo tyre dealers’ association (interview, tyre dealer, Sabon Gari, 25 Oct. 
2011) explained that relations with Muslim customers were strong: ‘My best customer is a 
Muslim.  I can trust my credit facility to them...  Business is about the market.  If someone 
starts discussing religion, I will be sceptical.  Leave religion, leave tribe...’.  Hausa Muslim 
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dealers were similarly sanguine about their access to Christian customers.  They argued that 
‘Customers respond to price not religion’.  Even goat’s head pepper soup producers 
indicated they still have Muslim customers, though they are increasingly being frightened 
away as a result of attacks on beer parlours by Boko Haram, causing a decline in sales that 
was as much lamented by butchers as by pepper soup producers. 
 
A particularly fascinating development involved the tendency of Muslim Hausa and Christian 
Igbo tyre producers to emulate each others’ business practices in response to the challenges 
of a changing economy.  Hausa dealers show a mixture of admiration and envy of the 
regulatory and capital mobilizing capacity of the Igbo tyre association.  Recent efforts to 
form a cooperative within the Hausa tyre market were explicitly modelled on Igbo business 
associations rather than on the old Hausa guild system.  Conversely, Igbo tyre dealers have 
also been taking on Hausa apprentices, and ‘settling’ them with significant start-up capital, a 
practice traditionally reserved for relatives and townsmen.  This was confirmed in interview 
with Igbo masters and by former Hausa apprentices now operating in the Sabon Gari and 
other tyre markets.  Igbo tyre dealers have also begun to use Shari’a courts in disputes with 
Hausa correspondents.  As one Igbo dealer explained, Shari’a courts a number of 
advantages, including greater respect among Hausas for their rulings, as well as avoiding the 
delays of the mainstream court system: ‘...remand, remand...the way of Magistrates Court is 
different from Shari’a Court.  We prefer Shari’a court’ (interview, tyre dealer, Sabon Gari, 27 
Oct. 2011).  Igbo tyre dealers also engage in philanthropy to demonstrate a commitment to 
Kano society.  The Igbo tyre dealers’ association collect money from members for ‘public 
service’, involving donations to institutions caring for orphans, prisoners and the disabled.  
They organize delegations to deliver their donations, and often alert the media to ensure 
that their efforts to be helpful to the community are noticed.  In their October 2011 
meeting, N 85,000 was collected for such donations. 
 
Even more surprising was a sense that riots were seen more as a dangerous disruption of 
business rather than a source of animosity.  Operators in all activities indicated that riots 
disrupt business for a few days, but that business then returns to normal with colleagues 
and customers across the religious divide.  Both Muslim and Christian tyre producers 
expressed confidence that their colleagues of the opposing religion would protect them if 
they got caught up in a riot.  A young Hausa tyre dealer operating in Sabon Gari claimed that 
he had no reservations about continuing to work in the Christian tyre market despite 
repeated religious riots.  His Igbo colleagues, he said, would protect him.  One motorcycle 
taxi rider explained that religious conflict affects Muslim and Christian alike, so it won’t 
divide them.  Another motorcycle taxi rider told of a conversation he had with an Igbo 
passenger shortly after the rider was caught up in a riot and almost killed.  The passenger 
explained that religious riots were like a fight between husband and wife. They love each 
other, but sometimes they fight (interview, Okada Rider, Sabon Gari 24 Oct. 2011). 
 
Indeed, none of the three categories of activities saw religious violence as their biggest 
problem.  In addition to constant emphasis on economic interdependence and religious 
crisis as a mutual enemy, all actors interviewed saw religious violence as one problem 
among many, and secondary to the core problem of livelihoods.  Motorcycle taxi riders saw 
the need for a proper job as primary, tyre dealers emphasized lack of capital and excessive 
taxes, while pepper soup producers and butchers saw capital, electricity and taxes as more 
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pressing.  While religious conflict was certainly recognized as a common problem, many saw 
it as a problem created by politics and poverty, not as something embedded in society.                  
 
Divisions and Signs of Stress 
Despite the remarkable resilience of inter-religious relations in all categories of informal 
activity, some cracks were beginning to show.  Igbo tyre dealers spoke of resentment 
beginning to linger longer that the few days after a riot, with some dealers now taking up to 
a month to restore credit relations with Hausa tyre dealers.  Conversely, Hausa dealers 
noticed more open cultural stereotyping on the part of Igbo dealers.  Igbo resentment over 
high taxation and exceptionally poor services in the Christian quarters was also palpable. 
The Chairman of the Igbo tyre dealers’ association complained that high taxes and 
cooperation in their collection was not matched by any improvement in services.  Anyone 
visiting Sabon Gari will notice its distinctively filthy surroundings and deplorable roads 
relative to surrounding Hausa communities, despite much higher levels of taxation.  As one 
Igbo businessman put it, ‘Sabon Gari is the dirtiest place in Kano, yet we pay Sanitation tax. 
...Give me the service and ask me to pay and I’ll pay!’  (interview, General Secretary of Auto-
Parts Dealers’ Association, Kano, 31 Oct. 2011).  By contrast, efforts to tax Muslim 
dominated motorcycle taxi riders are currently on hold owing to the unpopularity of the 
measure.   A large protest by motorcycle taxi riders in 2011 secured the intervention of the 
Emir of Kano, and taxation plans have been put on hold (Interview, Revenue Officer, Fagge 
Local Government 26 Oct. 2011). 
 
Among pepper soup producers, tensions over high taxes and poor services are compounded 
by state complicity in the routine destruction of property resulting from the State 
prohibition on selling alcohol outside Sabon Gari.  The public destruction of trailer loads of 
beer on their way to Sabon Gari, sometimes seized on Federal highways, were a source of 
mounting livelihood as well as political tensions.  As in the case of tyre dealers, however, 
anger directed at the State or Local Government did not yet seem to be souring relations 
with butchers or Muslim customers.     
   
Among Muslim informal actors, tensions seemed to have more of a class than a religious 
character.  For motorcycle taxi riders, the key source of stress arose from the registration 
drive being waged by their association, ACOMORAN, motivated by security and revenue 
concerns of the state.  The increasingly coercive character of the registration drive, involving 
the seizing of motorcycles by police to force registration, appears to be entrenching a sense 
of marginalization and resentment, particularly among the young and the poor.  The 
initiative has tended to increase rather than reduce official harassment, and, despite the use 
of carrots as well as sticks, a campaign that started in 2010 has only managed to achieve 
registration levels of about 10%.  In addition, efforts to regularize the activity run counter to 
the interests of the majority of operators, who see it as an activity of last resort.  As one 
operator put it bluntly, ‘This is not a job!’.  The result is a mounting sense of grievance and 
frustration in which motorcycle taxi riders feel they are being scapegoated for religious 
violence just because they are poor and Muslim, and forced into arrangements that only 
make things worse instead of addressing their real problems.  Young motorcycle operators 
as well as butchers also complained that they or their friends were subject to unjustified 
arrest in security sweeps after riots or bombings, which serves to intensify the sense of 
grievance among poor Muslim youth in these activities. 
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Inter-Religious Relations in Kaduna’s Informal Economy 
The city of Kaduna has a shorter but more fractious history than Kano.  Located at the 
frontier of Nigeria’s Muslim and Christian populations, Kaduna has large indigenous 
Christian as well as Muslim populations.  The organizational culture of the city is more 
bureaucratic than commercial, with a strong and intermittently integrative presence of 
government offices, factories and formal sector labour unions.  The large population shares 
of indigenous Muslims and Christians entail a higher degree of religious polarization in 
Kaduna than in Kano, resulting in a much greater susceptibility to religious violence.  Since 
the rise of the Shari’a law issue in the northern Nigeria in 1999, Kaduna has become 
increasingly volatile, with devastating riots and bomb attacks leading to growing religious 
segregation of previously integrated communities.  Muslims have tended to withdraw to 
Kaduna North Local Government Area, while Christians are shifting to Kaduna South LGA.   
History and Structure of Selected Informal Activities 
Tailoring offers an example of complementary relations across religious lines owing to the 
existence of religious specialization in particular lines within the activity.  In particular, the 
long-standing specialization of Muslim tailors in embroidery, an important element of 
fashion in both traditional and modern clothing, encourages symbiotic relations between 
Muslim and Christian tailors.  Highly skilled embroiderers are concentrated in the ward of 
Tudun Wada, the historical settlement for migrants from other parts of northern Nigeria, 
which has become a regional centre for high quality embroidery.  Estimates put the number 
of tailors in Kaduna metropolis at about 20,000, with a high level of female participation in 
the activity given a context in which men conventionally sew for men, and women sew for 
women.   
 
The motorcycle taxi business in Kaduna involves a mixture of Muslim and Christian 
operators working in competition with each other.  Motorcycle taxi riders from both 
religions operate across all parts of the city, though the share of Muslims is noticeably 
higher in Kaduna North, and the share of Christians higher in Kaduna South.  Drawing on 
interviews and figures from the Kaduna State Branch of ACOMORAN, estimates of numbers 
of motorcycle taxi riders in Kaduna South are 13,300, and in Kaduna North, 10,100.2    The 
study was restricted to these two Local Government Areas within Kaduna, which contain 
many of the busiest motorcycle taxi points as well as reflecting the impact of religious 
conflict particularly sharply.  The composition of Kaduna okada riders differs from that in 
Kano, involving a high share of former company and factory workers, as well as ex-civil 
servants and traders.  Levels of education were noticeably higher – some were even 
university graduates – and many had previously held ‘real jobs’, which they wanted to go 
back to.  In the face of high unemployment, the activity is over-saturated, depressing 
incomes as growing numbers of unemployed and underpaid actors enter the business.  
While many in Christian-dominated Kaduna South own their own motorcycles, operators in 
Muslim-dominated Kaduna North indicated that the majority of them do not.  Their 
motorcycles are owned by civil servants and the wives of influential people, who give them 
out and collect daily returns of N 3-500. 
 
                                                     
2
 Numbers calculated from ACOMORAN list of registered members, and estimates from independent 
interviews with LGA-level executives of the proportion of operators registered. 
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The goat’s head pepper soup business is organized slightly differently in Kaduna than in 
Kano. Goat meat sellers operate as intermediaries between pepper soup producers and 
butchers, and are therefore the focus of relations of value conflict.  Goat meat sellers are 
also dominated by Christian Igbo migrants, though some Muslim men are moving into the 
activity.  These intermediaries buy the goats live, and hire butchers to slaughter and prepare 
the meat and then sell it on to pepper soup producers and other customers.  This entails 
Christian women spending a significant part of their time inside the abattoir working with 
Muslim butchers. 
Associational Organization 
Three different tailors’ associations were present in Kaduna.  The first is the Kaduna State 
Tailors Union, which is the Kaduna branch of National Union of Tailors.  The second is the 
tailoring branch of National Union of Tailors, Garment and Textile Workers of Nigeria 
(NUTGTWN), created by efforts to incorporate tailors into the formal labour union 
structures.  And the third is a union of Muslim embroidery specialists, which has formed 
recently in response to what are perceived as different concerns of hand workers relative to 
tailors who are preoccupied with machines.  The first two unions are religiously mixed, and 
have religiously mixed executives.  Differences between them appear to be regional rather 
than religious.  The Kaduna branch of the National Union of Tailors appeals more to Kaduna 
State indigenes, Muslim as well as Christian, while the tailors’ branch of the National Textile 
Union showed a greater bias toward migrants from southern Nigeria and the Middle Belt, 
which has a Christian bias, but includes southern Muslims.  The embroiderers’ union is a 
Muslim union for a Muslim activity.  Both of the first two unions engage in vigorous 
negotiation with the state over taxes, achieving a reduction of 60% since the early 2000s in 
return for collecting taxes in bulk for the state. 
 
As in Kano, the association for motorcycle taxi riders is the State branch of the national 
association, ACOMORAN.  The Kaduna State branch of ACOMORAN has been in operation 
since the mid-late 1990s, nearly a decade earlier than the Kano branch.  Both the 
membership and the executives are religiously mixed, though with a strong Muslim bias in 
the State level executive; however, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Kaduna South 
zonal branch are Christians.  Members’ attitudes toward ACOMORAN seem more positive 
than in Kano.  Registration levels were estimated at 60% in Kaduna South, and 30% in 
Kaduna North.  The payment of a daily N20 operating tax was well institutionalized and 
attracted few complaints.  In return, members received greater protection from police 
harassment, as well as contributions to hospital costs in the event of accidents and support 
in times of bereavement.  While most felt the tax was manageable, they felt that the 
services they received in return were nominal.       
 
The goat meat intermediaries have an association that serves as a guarantor for credit, as 
well as providing standard social welfare assistance in times of bereavement.  Most felt that 
taxation was not a major problem since they do not face the predatory taxation experienced 
by pepper soup producers whose activities are more directly associated with alcohol.  They 
only pay the goat tax for live goat purchases, and the market stall fee for their place in the 
market.  Christian women and Muslim men do not appear to belong to the same goat meat 
sellers’ association.  Butchers are organized under the national Butchers’ Association, 
Kaduna State Branch.  The association negotiates taxes for them, charges modest monthly 




As in Kano, these associations show a capacity to negotiate over taxes where necessary.  
Once again, however, the ability to hold the state accountable for how taxes are used, or for 
other matters of concern to members, seems more variable.  The Kaduna branch of 
ACOMORAN has access to the state at all levels, but seems more upwardly than 
downwardly accountable.  The tailors’ unions each seem to pursue very different forms of 
access to the state.  The Kaduna branch of the National Union of Tailors is more focused on 
developing direct ties with state officials for access to resources and influence.  The head 
described the association as an ‘NGO’ and himself as a ‘politician’.  His considerable success 
in garnering resources was based on relations of patronage rather than accountability.  By 
contrast, the tailors’ branch of the National Textile Union seemed more concerned with 
issues of rights and accountability via the labour unions, but sometimes seemed to reflect 
the political concerns of the labour unions more than the livelihood concerns of their 
membership. 
Inter-Religious Relations and Signs of Stress 
Kaduna represents a paradoxical situation of significant religious integration of informal 
activities combined with a more palpable sense that inter-religious cooperation is being 
broken down by conflict.  In tailoring and motorcycle taxis, both the activities and their 
executives are religiously mixed, and there was no indication among the rank and file of 
either denomination of any sense of religious marginalization within the activity.  Yet 
Kaduna operators were much more concerned about the threat of weakening inter-religious 
relations, while in Kano, it was rare for interviewees to express such concerns.  Rather than 
maintaining that things just go back to normal after riots, there was a widespread sense that 
successive outbreaks of conflict are having a cumulative effect, through fear of entering 
certain areas, residential segregation, and the attendant loss of customers and disruption of 
business networks.  This was not understood in terms of growing religious antipathy with 
colleagues or customers, but as the product of an environment of insecurity that made 
economic interaction more difficult.     
 
As in Kano, most operators still have many customers from the opposite religion, and still 
routinely grant credit across religious lines to colleagues and customers. It was even 
suggested by one respondent that the religiously mixed associations in tailoring and 
motorcycle taxis should help to strengthen religious solidarity.  This seems to be the case 
among motorcycle taxis, where there is little evidence of religious tension between 
operators despite an over-saturated market in which Muslims and Christians compete with 
each other for customers.  Motorcycle taxi riders claimed they have no reservations about 
going into any area in the city by day, or about carrying any type of passenger.  Muslim as 
well as Christian operators indicated that they would assist riders of the opposite religions in 
the event of accidents, whether they were in the association or not.  Indeed, the main worry 
related to religious conflict was its tendency to delegitimize and silence motorcycle taxi 
riders politically.  They felt they were being unfairly criminalized by the police in the context 
of religious violence, which made it difficult for them to protest against threats to their 
livelihood, such as the removal of petrol subsidies, for fear of shoot-to-kill order or the 
possibility of triggering renewed cycles of violence.     
 
In the case of goat meat sellers and butchers, religiously segregated forms of occupational 
organization have also produced relatively cooperative inter-religious relations.  Many goat 
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meat sellers have been regular customers of the same butcher for years, even decades, and 
both sides spoke of structurally embedded credit relations between butchers and goat meat 
sellers.  Despite being dominated by Christian women working inside the abattoir with 
Muslim men wielding very sharp knives, many goat meat sellers expressed confidence that 
butchers would protect them in times of trouble, and told stories of such experiences in 
recent riots.  However, younger Christian goat meat sellers showed more signs of unease. 
There was also a growing worry that repeated crises were eroding markets for goat meat, as 
well as relations with customers across religious lines owing to the ways in which religious 
segregations was disrupting business networks. 
 
Complementary relations among tailors seem most negatively affected.  A number of tailors 
indicated a clear weakening of subcontracting relations between Christian tailors and 
Muslim embroiderers.  Some Christian tailors said they are no longer comfortable going into 
Tudun Wada, while others only send cloth for embroidery via a Muslim colleague.  Tailors 
are also more affected by the disruption of business networks caused by religious 
segregation, leading to loss of customers from the opposite religion as people withdraw into 
more religiously segregated neighbourhoods.  The problem was not experienced as a rise in 
religious antipathy, but as the impact of insecurity on inter-religious proximity and 
opportunities for interaction.      
 
Despite these worries, it was widely expressed across all activities that religious conflict is 
not their biggest problem.  Tailors worried most about high taxes and lack of electricity, 
motorcycle taxi riders were most concerned about getting a real job, and goat meat sellers 
were also concerned about rising prices and lack of electricity.  Religious conflict was a 
pervasive concern, but as in Kano, livelihood issues were seen as a more serious threat to 
popular wellbeing, as well as an underlying cause of religious conflict. 
Conflict, Informality and Governance in Northern Nigeria      
Quantitative analysis confirms interview evidence of inter-religious cooperation among the 
majority of informal actors in all activity categories, even those characterized by 
competititon and value conflicts across the religious divide.  Table 1 compares the social 
composition of activities and the effects of religious violence at the city level in Kano and 
Kaduna.  While the share of Christians, migrants and women are influenced by the nature of 
the particular activities selected, there is a clear over-representation of migrants in both 
cities, and an under-representation of women.  Despite the inclusion of activities open to 
women, religious conflict has been associated with a noticeable incursion of men into the 
previously female domains of women’s tailoring, pepper soup production and goat meat 
selling, partly because operating in conflict-prone settings has intensified social constraints 
on women’s mobility.  Despite fairly similar levels of Christian, migrant and female 
participation in these activities, the effects of religious conflict are quite different between 
the two cities.  Kaduna shows markedly higher levels of personal losses and loss of 
customers across the religious divide, reflecting the higher levels of religious polarization 
and violence in the city, and the effect of intensifying religious segregation.   






Table 1:  Comparison of Firm Head Characteristics and Impact of Religious Conflict  
in Kano and Kaduna 






























Kano 26.7 48.3 8.3 43.3 30.0 51.7 45.0 
Kaduna 24.0 54.0 12.0 60.0 48.0 50.0 36.0 
Average 25.5 50.9 10.0 50.9 38.2 50.9 40.9 
 
Source:  Fieldwork 
 
These physical risks contrast with the fact that half of operators in both cities still give credit 
across religious lines – which amounts to a significant majority of those who give credit at 
all, since motorcycle taxis, comprising a full third of respondents, are structurally unable to 
grant credit.  Despite decades of religious violence in both cities, only 40% of informal actors 
feel that inter-religious business cooperation is breaking down, confirming interview 
evidence of ongoing cooperation and economic interdependence.  However, the indication 
that Kaduna operators are less affected by declining inter-religious business cooperation 
seems at odds with higher levels of religious polarization and violence.  Regression analysis 
showed that the sense of negative feelings about inter-religious business cooperation was 
driven by the share of indigenes, Muslim or Christian, in informal activities rather than by 
religious composition.  While Kaduna is more polarized and religiously tense, it has a lower 
share of indigenes in informal activities owing to its weaker commercial history.  This 
suggests that disappointed indigenous entitlement rather than religious animosity are key 
issues behind religious tensions.      
 
Table 2 shows the relationship between social composition and effects of religious violence 
in terms of activity categories rather than cities.  Relative to the wider populations, the 
distribution of indigenes across these activities is predictably low, while that of Christians 
seems more representative (though high for Kano and low for Kaduna).  More remarkable, 
however, is the inverse relationship between harm suffered and the strength of inter-
religious cooperation.  Activities with complementary and competitive relations across the 
religious divide have suffered relatively comparable levels of business losses and physical 
harm to themselves and loved ones, and both show a comparable 42% concern about 
weakening inter-religious business cooperation.  However, activities experiencing value 
conflicts across the religious divide show by far the highest level of business losses and 
inter-religious customer loss, but the lowest sense of weakening inter-religious business 





































Complementarity 46.7 17.8 48.9 33.3 37.8 42.2 
Competition 55.6 31.1 40.0 35.6 22.2 42.2 
Conflict 40.0 30.0 80.0 30.0 75.8 35.0 
Average 49.1 25.5 50.9 33.6 38.2 40.9 
 
Source:  Fieldwork 
 
The remarkable resilience of inter-religious cooperation in the face of religious polarization, 
competition and value conflicts, and harm suffered during religious violence give pause for 
thought.  Both interview evidence and survey evidence shows that religious conflict is not 
perceived by the majority of informal actors to be their central problem.  When asked to list 
their three most serious challenges, religious conflict was selected as one of the top three 
by 62% of respondents, coming second behind lack of capital, listed as one of the top three 
challenges by 71% of respondents.  Disaggragating between Kano and Kaduna, religious 
conflict still came second in both cities.  Informal actors across all activities tend to perceive 
religious conflict as a result of poverty and frustration from below and political mobilization 
from above, rather than as something arising from organizational tensions internal to the 
informal economy.  Indeed, some suggested that the government should consult informal 
economic actors on how to resolve religious tensions, since they have found ways to work 
together despite problems of conflict in the wider society.  
Conclusion  
The impact of informal economies on religious conflict in northern Nigeria challenges 
notions of a causal link between informal economies, ethno-religious diversity and violence.  
While religious polarization in Kaduna seems to be associated with higher levels of violence 
than Kano, relations within the informal economy in both cities have tended to diffuse 
rather than to inflame conflict.  Three key observations emerge with regard to how the 
informal economy affects religious conflict in the northern Nigerian context.  The first is that 
religiously specialized informal organization does not appear to be any more divisive than 
religiously mixed forms of organization.  Secondly, it is the informal institutions embedded 
in informal activities rather than mere market relations that foster cooperative relations 
across the religious divide.  Thirdly, efforts to incorporate the informal economy into formal 
systems of governance, such as efforts at taxation and other state linkages with informal 
associations, have done more to exacerbate than to alleviate inter-religious tensions in 
northern Nigeria. 
 
With regard to debates over the optimal kind of informal organization, religiously 
specialized informal organization seems at least as resilient in the face of religious conflict as 
religiously mixed forms of organization.  In Kano, the religiously specialized networks of 
indigenous occupational organization have more deeply embedded institutions of 
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cooperation and conflict resolution, and strong popular legitimacy.  By contrast, Kaduna’s 
religiously-mixed associations in tailoring and motorcycle taxi riding tend to be less 
vulnerable to divisive forms of taxation, but are also shallower, more politicized, and more 
upwardly than downwardly accountable.  Yet both types of informal economic organization 
have sustained a remarkable level of collaboration and resilience in the face of mounting 
religious conflict, even amid relations of competititon or value conflict across the religious 
divide. 
 
This connects with the second observation, that the capacity of informal economies to build 
bridges between divided communities arises, not from free market interaction, but from 
informal institutions embedded in economic activities.  Institutionalized arrangements such 
as inter-religious credit systems, mechanisms of conflict resolution, and disciplined informal 
associations do not simply spring into being when two groups come together in the market, 
but evolve over years and even centuries of commercial relations across ethno-religious 
divides.  Differing commercial histories make such informal commercial institutions more 
widespread in Kano than in Kaduna, and more widespread in West Africa, with its pre-
colonial trading networks and colonial peasant economies, than in Central or Southern 
Africa, where concession economies and labour reserves brutally suppressed embedded 
commercial systems (Mkandawire 2010). 
 
A final observation is that formal linkages with the state, exemplified by taxation and 
support for informal associations, appear to exacerbate rather than to mitigate conflict in 
the Nigerian context.  While Armakolas (2011) draws attention to the role of the state in 
shoring up inter-religious relations in civil society, and Jha (2007) emphasizes the integrative 
importance of redistributive taxation, this northern Nigerian case shows that the state at all 
levels can also erode inter-religious solidarity through inequitable taxation and a failure to 
rein in divisive public behaviour.  The evidence presented here shows that taxing the 
informal economy in divided societies can intensify conflict; in Kano, those who pay the 
most tax have the least political voice, owing to levers of public accountability based more 
on identity than on fiscal relations.  Similarly, the State government’s failure to rein in the 
excesses of Shari’a politics, evident in the public destruction of beer bottles by the Hisbah 
guard in Kano, weakens inter-religious cooperation.  In Kaduna, religiously mixed informal 
activities and more equitable taxation is undercut by greater politicization of associations, 
making them equally vulnerable to divisive political mobilization and declining grassroots 
legitimacy.  In each case, formal linkages with the state have reinforced relations of ethno-
religious patronage and marginalization, and placed mounting strains on embedded 
collaborative relations across the religious divide.  While the institutions of the Nigerian 
informal economy offer valuable institutional resources for diffusing inter-religious conflict, 
efforts to incorporate them into divisive formal governance processes threaten to turn them 
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